One-day conference, May 10, 2008
University of Paris I - Panthéon Sorbonne
University of Paris I - Panthéon Sorbonne
contact: a.c.zielinska@gmail.com
09h00 Sandra Laugier (Université de Picardie Jules Verne, Amiens ; CURAPP), « Ethics and Attention to Particulars »
10h00 Solange Chavel (Université de Picardie Jules Verne, Amiens ; CURAPP), « Se passer des principes dans le raisonnement moral ? Sur l’usage du mot “principe” »
10h30 Smadar Bustan (University of Luxembourg), « The limits of an ethics without principles with Levinas and Putnam »
11h00 Coffee break
11h30 Nora Hämäläinen (University of Helsinki), « Two particularisms – between Dancy and Swansea »
12h00 Darragh Byrne (University of Birmingham), « Moral particularism: epistemology or metaphysics? »
12h30 Philipp Schwind (Collegium Oecumenicum, München), « Does holism imply moral particularism? »
13h00 Lunch
14h30 John Skorupski (University of St. Andrews), « Knowledge of Reasons; Self-determination and Warrantable Reasons »
15h30 Anna Bergqvist (University of Reading), « Particularism and Semantic Normativity »
16h00 Coffee break
16h30 Pekka Väyrynen (University of California, Davis), « Explaining Exceptions in Ethics »
17h00 Alan Thomas (University of Kent), « Another Particularism: Reason, ‘Status’ and Defaults »
17h45 Jonathan Dancy (University of Reading, University of Texas, Austin), «Particularism in Epistemology»
British moral philosophy is nowadays confronted with a new challenge, under the name of moral particularism. The main theses of this position were first explicitly formulated in Mind in 1981, and then reiterated even more forcefully in 1983, by Jonathan Dancy. Belonging to intuitionist tradition, Dancy refined some of its ideas, inspired partly by John McDowell, but also quoting the names of Ludwig Wittgenstein and Jean-Paul Sartre. He attained thus a form of anti-anti-realism in moral philosophy, characterised by two major theses: there are no moral principles, and moral motivation is not something special as compared to any other motivation one might have. Dancy adds to those features the idea of holism of reasons, i.e. the idea that a consideration that is a reason for acting in a certain way in one case may not be a reason for acting in that way, or even a reason for not acting in that way, in other cases. This requires taking carefully into account the whole set of reasons relevant in given circumstances. This metaethical enterprise is to be understood in a broader context of English-speaking philosophy dealing with the problem of reasons and the one of normativity; here, a significant work is made by, among others, John Skorupski.
This tradition of careful scrutiny of particulars is also quite lively in France and goes far beyond the Sartrian heritage. In the most contemporary moral philosophy one might notice a growing interest in philosophical positions refusing general answers and suspicious of principles, both from members of “continental” and “analytic” traditions. In this context, we would like to confront one of the most stimulating movements in moral thought in the English-speaking world with the ideas purported by thinkers who do not belong directly to the same metaethical tradition, but whose methods, analyses and conclusions might contribute to understanding the new requirements and needs emerging in today’s moral philosophy. We also aim to provide a framework for thinking about the epistemological constraints entailed by a non-systematic account of ethics, and ask some questions about the relevance and legitimacy of moral discourse.
10h00 Solange Chavel (Université de Picardie Jules Verne, Amiens ; CURAPP), « Se passer des principes dans le raisonnement moral ? Sur l’usage du mot “principe” »
10h30 Smadar Bustan (University of Luxembourg), « The limits of an ethics without principles with Levinas and Putnam »
11h00 Coffee break
11h30 Nora Hämäläinen (University of Helsinki), « Two particularisms – between Dancy and Swansea »
12h00 Darragh Byrne (University of Birmingham), « Moral particularism: epistemology or metaphysics? »
12h30 Philipp Schwind (Collegium Oecumenicum, München), « Does holism imply moral particularism? »
13h00 Lunch
14h30 John Skorupski (University of St. Andrews), « Knowledge of Reasons; Self-determination and Warrantable Reasons »
15h30 Anna Bergqvist (University of Reading), « Particularism and Semantic Normativity »
16h00 Coffee break
16h30 Pekka Väyrynen (University of California, Davis), « Explaining Exceptions in Ethics »
17h00 Alan Thomas (University of Kent), « Another Particularism: Reason, ‘Status’ and Defaults »
17h45 Jonathan Dancy (University of Reading, University of Texas, Austin), «Particularism in Epistemology»
British moral philosophy is nowadays confronted with a new challenge, under the name of moral particularism. The main theses of this position were first explicitly formulated in Mind in 1981, and then reiterated even more forcefully in 1983, by Jonathan Dancy. Belonging to intuitionist tradition, Dancy refined some of its ideas, inspired partly by John McDowell, but also quoting the names of Ludwig Wittgenstein and Jean-Paul Sartre. He attained thus a form of anti-anti-realism in moral philosophy, characterised by two major theses: there are no moral principles, and moral motivation is not something special as compared to any other motivation one might have. Dancy adds to those features the idea of holism of reasons, i.e. the idea that a consideration that is a reason for acting in a certain way in one case may not be a reason for acting in that way, or even a reason for not acting in that way, in other cases. This requires taking carefully into account the whole set of reasons relevant in given circumstances. This metaethical enterprise is to be understood in a broader context of English-speaking philosophy dealing with the problem of reasons and the one of normativity; here, a significant work is made by, among others, John Skorupski.
This tradition of careful scrutiny of particulars is also quite lively in France and goes far beyond the Sartrian heritage. In the most contemporary moral philosophy one might notice a growing interest in philosophical positions refusing general answers and suspicious of principles, both from members of “continental” and “analytic” traditions. In this context, we would like to confront one of the most stimulating movements in moral thought in the English-speaking world with the ideas purported by thinkers who do not belong directly to the same metaethical tradition, but whose methods, analyses and conclusions might contribute to understanding the new requirements and needs emerging in today’s moral philosophy. We also aim to provide a framework for thinking about the epistemological constraints entailed by a non-systematic account of ethics, and ask some questions about the relevance and legitimacy of moral discourse.
Anna C. ZIELINSKA
Université Pierre Mendès France, Grenoble 2
Université Pierre Mendès France, Grenoble 2
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